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Abstract 
One group of targets attacked using armed force was the Iraqi electrical system. A direct impact of that attack 
was the damaging of four hydroelectric power plants, six thermoelectric power plants as well as several other 
power plants and it was suspected that a few deaths or wounds were a direct side effect on civilians. The 
damaging of 10 power plants resulted in the there being a lack of power both for Iraq’s military facilities as well 
as for civil uses. Attacks are ideally defined as acts of violence done against an enemy done either when 
attacking or when defending but it also needs to be specified on what level is it done. On a tactical level attacks 
are defined as single attacks or individual attackson each target such as the ones on the electrical power plants. 
that it is balanced with military interests/necessity which is also not specified by International Humanitarian 
These civillian losses are such losses that have the traits of being concrete, direct and overall which bear the 
same definition as  the traits concrete, direct and overall applied in military advantages or conversely, if the 
mlitary advantages do not bear the traits of being concrete, direct and overall. 
Keywords: Proportionality of Aerial Attacks,  Iraqi Electrical Power Systems, First Gulf War. 
 
1. Introduction 
On 17 January Coalition Forces who were authorised based on UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 
1990 began an air war, followed by a war on the ground against Iraqi forces. This is due to Iraq having invaded 
and subsequently annexing the whole of Kuwait on 2nd August. This air war consisted of two campaigns done 
consecutively; Operation Instant Thunder which was then followed by Operation Desert Storm. 
One group of targets attacked using armed force was the Iraqi electrical system. A direct impact of that 
attack was the damaging of four hydroelectric power plants,1 six thermoelectric power plants2 as well as several 
other power plants and it was suspected that a few deaths or wounds were a direct side effect on civilians3. The 
damaging of 10 power plants resulted in the there being a lack of power both for Iraq’s military facilities as well 
as for civil uses. Said lack of power for the Iraqi military resulted in the disabling of the facilities which 
supported Iraq’s military strength and aided in reducing Iraq’s ability to respond to Coalition attacks.4 This was 
the military advantage that was intended by the operation against the Iraqi electrical power system. 
Conversely the severe shortage of power for Iraqi civillians resulted ib nabt facilities such as those for 
health, food and sanitation were unable to function, for example; food processing plants, clean water, sewafe 
treatment and disposal systems, hospitals, farming systems including irrigation and food storage facilities were 
unable to function. As a result, Iraqi civilians experienced a shortage of food and clean water as well as their 
environments becoming dirty due to sewage overflowing insde and outside their homes. Another consequence 
was that civillians suffered from malnutrition and infectious diseases which were further exacerbated by the lack 
of available treatment facilities and it was surmised that over 70,000 civilians died .5 
The existence of those two effects due to the use of force towards electrical production resulted in 
debates regarding the proportionality of those attacks. On one side, the attacks towards the Iraqi electrical power 
system was viewed as being proportional.6 And on the other, it was viewed as being disproportional.1 The 
                                                           
1Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths In The Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War, A 
Middle East Watch Report, New York, p. P.169 
2 Ibid p.171 
3SeeU.S., Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, H, p. 342-343. As quoted inDR, J.W. Crawford, III, The Law of Non-Combatan Immunity 
and The Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, p. 110. online at  dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00042.00010. 
4CDR, J.W. Crawford, III, The Law of Non-Combatan Immunity and The Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, p. 101, online 
pada  dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00042.00010. 
5William M. Arkin, "Tactical Bombing of Iraqi Forces Outstripped Value of Strategic Hits, Analyst Contends," Aviation Week &Space 
Technology, (January 27,1992): p. 63; Walid Doleh, Warren Piper, Abdel Qamhieh, and Kamel al Tallaq, Report by the International Study 
Team, Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In-Depth Assessment, Electrical Facilities Survey, October 1991. 
6Coalition forces, for example, viewed that attack as being porportional due to the existence of a large military advantage (though not one 
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difference in views raises the issue regarding the vagueness of assessing the proportionality of the attacks on 
Iraqi electrical facilities in th First Gulf War.Therefore, this paper will discuss how to assess the proportionality 
of attacks on electrical power systems such as those belonging to Iraq in the Gulf War I. The discussion will 
include; what is an attack?, what do civilian losses and military advantagesincurred by these attacks? And how 
yo calculate the proportionality of those attacks under International Humanitarian Law and the principles of 
justice. 
 
2. Definition of Attacks on Electrical Power Systems 
2.1 Definition of Electrical Power Systems 
A common power system consists of four basic subsystems namely ; generation , control , transmission and 
distribution.2the generation subsystem, consists of; turbineand generatorsdriven by; steam, hydro (water), a 
source of heat (thermal), nuclearand others (oil-diesel). These sources of energy provides power to make the 
turbine blades, rotate the generators which will then produce electricity in bulk.3 Replacement components for 
turbine and generator are usually not readilt available due to an expensive capital cost, so damages to the turbine 
and generator can cause long-term losses.4 
The control subsystem serves as the brain of the national electricity grid that coordinates the generator 
facilities to manage the transfer of emergenc power andto increase reliability.5A control center may be located 
fused or separate from the generator, attacks on the control subsystem could result in failure which roles like a 
snow ball throughout the entire system, causing widespread and excessive equipment failure.6 
The transmission subsystem, such as transformers which receive electricity and convert it into a higher 
voltage for transmission through high voltage power lines.7Distribution subsystems presents a much less 
favorable target for the use of air power. After electricity has been transmitted to a high voltage power line, it 
will be then accepted at a load center, converted down to a lower voltage or “stepped down” and then distributed 
to users across the network.Transformer step down stations are smaller and provide a hard to identify target for 
air attacks. Unlike other larger subsystems, they are a standard design and are much easier to replace.8As a result, 
the impact of air strikes on this part of the sstem are short-term and are limited to the area provided by that 
transformer.9 In the Iraq war case, those strikes were directed at least at the generator subsystem consisting of 
four hydroelectric power plants and six thermoelectirc power plants. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that was direct) and disadvantages suffered by the civilian populations  were not included in calculations due to it being indirect. It was 
discovered that the large advantage mentioned by the coalition forces by destroying the electrical systems was that the civillians would suffer 
and thus that would push them to oust Saddam Hussein. (seeHuman Rights Watch, Needless Deaths In the Gulf War, Civilian Casualties 
During the Air Campaign  and Violations of the Laws of War , A Middle East Watch Report , New York, p.9, online 
athttps://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/). As such were the views of coalition forces; it being a kind of military advantage that added to 
the weight of said military advantage. 
1HRW for example viewed the commander of the forces as having misused the rule of proportionality by giving inappropriate weight to the 
perceived military advantage of the attack (Ibid). In other words, the military advantages of that attack is not as large as it was assumed as it 
did not include the civillians losses which would encourage them to topples Saddam Hussein. 
Aside from that, the attack was also viewed as being disproportional due to the assumption that the adverse effects on the civillian population 
which were calculated also included indirect losses arising from the derivative effects (reverberating effect) and thus the total losses to the 
civilian populations and objects were far larger and practically exceeds the military advantages of that attack. Greenwood, for example, 
tenedd to choose to include also the long-term effects by saying “a short timeframe is more likely to render less effective attempts to limit the 
level of collateral casualties from the attack,” (Greenwood, C. Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the 
Gulf conflict. in P.Rowe(ed.). 1993. The Gulf War (1990-1991).  International and English Law. Routledge,  London: 79).  See  Blakeley, R. 
2003. Bomb Now and Die Latter : Was the Bombing Campaign Undertaken By The UN Coalition Aadvantagest Iraq, In 1991, Fought 
According To Just War Conventions? Department of Politics, University of Bristol. p. 27 (Online), 
(www.geocities.com/ruth_blakeley/bombnowdielater.htm, diakses  04-08-2004).  Thus the debate here relating to the matter of the scope of 
the definition of the elements which were compared, in this case being the military benefits and harm to civilians and civilian objects, 
whether the advantages and disadvantages that were intendedencompasses advantages and losses which were direct or does it also include 
indirect or derivative advantages and losses thereof, whether military advantages could also include civilian losses in order to encourage 
them to overthrow Saddam Hussein. 
2 John A. Warden, II, "The Enemy as a System," Airpower Journal (Spring 1995, p. 44 
3Thomas E. Griffith, Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems (Maxwell, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University 
Press, 1994), p. 5. 
4Ibid., 6. 
5Burr W. Leyson, The Miracle of Light and Power (New York E.P. Dutton &Co., Inc., 1955), 45-47; North American Electric Reliability 
Council, Electricity Transfers and Reliability  (Princeton, NJ: North American Electric Reliability Council, October 1989), 24-26. 
6Griffith, Strategic Attack of National Electric Systems, p.7  
7Ibid 
8 Ibid, p. 8, see alsoDonald G. Fink and H. Wayne Beaty, eds., Standard Handbook for ElectricalEngineers (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 
1987), pp. 10-52 
9J.W. Crawford, IIIThe Law of Non-Combatan Immunity and The Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems CDR, online pada 
dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00042.00010  
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2.2 Definition of Attack form the Humanitarian Law Perspective 
In Humanitarian Law, there is a term associated with war; military1 andattack.2Though there is no explanation on 
the term military. There was however en explanation on the defenition of attack in article 49 Additional Protocol 
I Geneva 1977 as being; “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”. Who is meant 
by adversary was not explained further. Given there being prohibitions on deliberately carrying out attacks on 
civillians and civillian objects in this Additional Protocol, these acts of deliberate violence only points to the 
oppositiona and its military Yet the question remains, why the attacks were not regarded as acts of violence 
against opposition combatants and military objects. Does this mean that the definition ofopponents is not only 
combatants and military objects as individuals or separately but also as capabilities such as, during Gulf War I,  
telecommunicationsand C3 syste,s (Command, Control, and Communications) or even electrical power system. 
Apropos these capablities were divided into multiple targets which were seperate and therefore acts of violence 
against these capabilities were a combination of attacks against each target,  are these combination attacks also 
included in the definition of an attack as well. This is not explained further. Thus there is no clear boundaries 
regarding attacks in Humanitarian Law. 
Knut Dormann said that “the concept of attack as defined in this provision refers to the use of armed 
force to carry out a military operation during an armed conflict”.3This definition also does provide any clarity on 
whether or not the attack which had to be disproportional, were a combination of attacks on individual targets or 
were they separate. 
2.2.1 Definition of Attack from the Perspectived of the Levels of War 
Use of force or war in present times generally have the following; involving the use of troops which has risen 
dramatically, involves the geographical expansion of the theater of war and/or operations, increasing the distance 
of the theater of war from the “center”, a relatively long duration, increasing complexity of warr because it no 
longer consists of a single battle (decisive) or a limited number of battles, but a series of battles that happen 
either simultaneously or successively, organized into campaigns and operations.4In addition to the features above, 
the use of force or war have other common characteristics which is they have a certain common purpose, such as 
to defend a friendly country form aggression by other parties.To achieve this general goal , war or the use of 
force must be systematically arranged into multiple levels or tiers . 
Generally, scholars or military manuals recognize that war is structured on three levels.5 But there is 
also three-leveld more to add to this as well as another level6 and some give slightly different names for all three 
of these levels.7 What is clear is generally recognized that the war can generally be divided into three levels 
namely ; 
 
1. Strategic level 
This is a level that exists on the national level/nationality or national/multinational. On the strategic there are the 
following characteristics; 
- War has not occurred between a nation/country and its enemies 
                                                           
1The term military operation can be found in article53 of Ivth Geneva Convention 1949,  article  51 Para 1 Additional Protocal I Geneva 
1977, article 1 para 1 Additional Protocol II Geneva 1977, Pasal 7 cand7 d ii Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict The Hague, 26 March 1999 (now known as Protocol II Den Haaq 1999) 
2The term attack has been often use in the rules in the Additional Protocol  I Geneva 1977 and also found in Additional Protocol   II Geneva 
1977 
3Knut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Sorces and Commentary, ICRC, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 169 
4Panos Mavropoulos, Operational Level of War: A Tool for Planning and Conducting Wars or an Illusion?,  Journal of Computations & 
Modelling, vol.4, no.1, 2014, p. p8 
5  See SeeFigure 2-1 on  The Levels of WarinFM3-0 Chapter 2Unified Action - Reliable Security Informationonline 
athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch2.htm; Robert Bateman. Robert Bateman, Understanding Military 
Strategy and the Four Levels of War: When "strategy" gets thrown around by politicians and the media, you can bet it's being misused online 
pada  
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a39985/four-levels-of-war/ ; Panos Mavropoulos, Operational Level of War: A Tool for 
Planning and Conducting Wars or an Illusion?,  Journal of Computations & Modelling, vol.4, no.1, 2014, p. 91. Online 
padahttp://www.scienpress.com/Upload/JCM/Vol%204_1_7.pdf; Bunyamin Tuner, Operational and Tactical Levels of War: A Balanced 
Systematic Approach, Naval PostGraduate School, p. 15, Online pada http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a418305.pdf; James Jacobs, 
Illustrating the Levels of War – Operation Zitadelle (KURSK), 5-14 July 1943, a Case Study, p. 79 online pada  
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/viewFile/81055/71280:  Department of The Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, NWP 3-32, Edition October 2008, p.2-1 
6 Rober Bateman for example divides use of armed force or warinto four levels; Political level, Strategic, Operational, and War Tactics.. Even 
further Milan N Vego, says that the four levels of war are; national strategy, theatre strategy, operational and tactics (Milan N Vego, Joint 
Oprational warfare: Theory and Practice, 2007,p 79 
7 See for example Ryan Christian Else who divides the levels of uses of armed forces or war into three levels called; strategic campaign, 
tactical campaignandcertain tactical operation (see; Ryan Christian Else, Proportionality In The Law of Armed Conflict the Proper Unit of 
Analysis For Military Operations, Else_Post_Macro.Docx 4/11/2011, pp 200-2001 online  at 
https://www.stthomas.edu/media/schooloflaw/pdf/jlpp/volume5no1/Else_195-213.pdf .  
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- Nation or one group of nations who will battle has defined national and multinational security 
objectives and determined guidelines, the development and use of national resources to achieve the 
national and the multinational security objectives.1 
- When a movement or cause for the use of armed force occurre, the highest authority in the country 
(head of state/head of government) in accordance with the constitutional system prevailing in the 
country creates a national policy with respect to national and multinational security goals.2For example 
how to restore situations back to its original state before the cause (for example; restoring the legitimate 
government of friendly countries)  
- As the name implies, it was decided on this strategic level; strategies, namely those on how to use the 
armed forces and other instruments of national power to secure national objectives or multinational. 
This strategy is referred to as the national military strategy. In national military strategy, national policy 
is translated as a strategic military purposes by akind of National Command Authority. 3 National 
strategic military purposes, of course in accordance with the national policy that is for example how to 
restore the situation back to its original state before the cause that to happen. In the context of the Gulf 
War, for example, the goal of national or multinational or national policy or national strategic military 
goal is to restore the government of Kuwait ousted by Iraqi military forces.4In realizing these national 
strategic military purposesa strategy is also planned out (which of course, national), which is referred to 
as a theater strategy is a strategy of war to the regional level (national or multinational). This strategy 
has its own goal to achieve the national strategic military goals or national policies.5In the Gulf war the 
goal of strateg theatre is to, for example, disable Iraqi forces in Iraq and Kuwait. 
 
2. Operational Level 
To carry out the purpose of theatre strategy and national strategic military purposes it needs the use of armed 
force. The use of armed force starts from thetheatre scale known as campaigns then broken up into operations 
ormajor operations. Therefore this level is referred to as the operational level which is the level at which 
campaigns and major operations or operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives 
within a particular region or area6. This explanation shows that at the operational level , there are two main levels 
of activity namely the use of armed force; 
a. Campaigns or as some refer to as strategic campaigns 7  are activities that use armed forces 
containing these traits; 1) consists of a set or series of interrelated operations or main operation or 
campaign tactical,8  2) done in a certain time9 atau or in other words there is limited time to do this 
activity, 3) is performed in a chamber or a specific place that is called the theater of war 10intended 
as a given geographical area where the campaign occurs,11 4)carried out by a large number of 
troops with diverse abilities and units led by senior officers , the maximum of which is the 
general,12 5) to achieve certain goals are referred to as strategic objectives 13which is the purpose 
of theatre strategy and ultimately also the militaary purposes of national strategy. A Example of 
campaigns in the 1991 Gulf War are Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.14 The objectives 
to be achieved are the pbjectives of theatre strategy, namely the destruction of the Iraqi Armed 
Forces in the  South Euphrates,15that the achievement of this goal also means the achievement of 
national policy or national strategic military purposes, for example the restoration of the 
government of Kuwait which was annexed by Iraq.16 
                                                           
1FM3-0 Chapter 2Unified Action - Reliable Security Information online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-
0/ch2.htm 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid  
4  See Figure 2-1 about The Levels of War dalam FM3-0 Chapter 2Unified Action - Reliable Security Information online at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch2.htm 
5The strategical purpose of Gulf War was theater. For example destroying of Iraqi army weapon in South Iraq.  
6 Ibid 
7 Ryan Christian Else, op cit.  
8 See Ryan Christian Else; Directorate Language Services, SADF, Joint Military Dictionary, p. 277; Panos Mavropoulos, p. 97; FM3-0 
Chapter 2 Unified Action;  British Army, Army Doctrine Publication, p. 4-1. 
9See Ryan Christian Else: Directorate Language Services; British Army, Army Doctrine Publication, p. 4-1. 
10James Jacobs, NATO APP-06 (2013) 
11 Robert Bateman, Op cit. 
12 Ryan Christian Else, pp 200-201 
13 Ryan Christian Else; Directorate Language Services, SADF, NATO APP-06 (2013); Bunyamin Tuner, British Army, Army Doctrine 
Publication, 
14 SeeFigure 2-1 tentang  The Levels of War dalam FM3-0 Chapter 2Unified Action - Reliable Security Informationonline at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch2.htm 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
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b. Operations or main operations or major operations or also often called tactical campaigns1 are 
activities which involve the use of armed forces with thefollowing characteristics; is a part of 
campaigns which consistsconsists of a series of tactical actions (battle, engagement and strike) 
done with a variety of coordinated combat power by one or more agencies,2carried out within a 
certain span of time,3in a room or a specific place referred to as the operational area4 which 
becomes a part or a fragment of the theatre of war,5committed by a small amount of troops as a 
fragment of the entire army campaign6 led by middle-ranking officers,7to achieve certain goals 
whichare referred to as operational objectives.8This objective is related to the purpose of the 
campaign which is the realization of the goal of this operation thus the campaign objectivesor the 
goals of theatre strategy or strategic military purposes are alsomanifested. 
In the Gulf War , this operation consists of ; The operation against the regime ( the senior authority of 
decision making ) of Iraq, the operation against the Strategic Integrated Iraq Air Defense System, operations 
against the NBC warring abilities of (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Iraq, operations against important Iraqi 
power projection, infrastructure and military production, operations against Iraqi military and mechanical 
equipment in Kuwait. This operation can be divided into sub operations depending on the complexity in 
achieving the goals or objectives t operation, as seen in Gulf War I. 
 
3. Tactical level 
Some also call this the tactical operations level.9To realize the goal of the operation or suboperation, the 
operation or suboperations are done through separate battles or attacks within that operational area. Hence the 
use of the term strike which raises raises; battle 10 (battles involving large units such as corps), 11 
engagement 12 (battles involving smaller units at the level of divisions or lower), 13 small unit sand crew 
actions14(for example one tank units confronts/engages another tank unit).15 Use of force at the tactical level 
aims to (kill, destroyorruin) targets whose death, destruction or ruin is the primary objective the operation strives 
to fulfill (use of armed force or war on an operational level). 
The purpose of using armed forces at the top level is assisted by the fulfillment of the purpose of armed 
forces at the lower levels and so on until the realizzation of the objectives of the strategic level. In the context of 
the use of armed force or air war by coalition forces against Iraqi forces, the structure of the air war can be 
collated in the following table: 
Table 1 Structure of the Coalition Air War in Gulf War I 
Strategi-c 
Level 
Operational Level  Tactical Level 
Campai-gn Operation Suboperation Sub-Sub Operations 
Strate-gic 
Militar-y 
Objec-tive; 
Making Iraq 
immed-iately 
and uncon-
ditio-nally 
with-draw all 
its troops to 
their original 
posi-tions on 1 
August 1990 
 
Thea-tre Stra-
tegy Objec-
tives (TSO); 
Inca-pacita-ting 
Opera-tion 
Instant Thun-
der (OIT) and 
Opera-tion 
Desert Storm 
(ODS)  
 
To realize the 
goals set at the 
strategic levels 
Operation Against 
rezim (otoritas 
pengambil keputusan 
senior) Irak (Op I) 
 
To isolate and 
incapaci-tate the Iraqi 
regime (senior 
decision-making 
authority) 
(making leaders hide 
or move around, thus 
making it difficult for 
them to control their 
military forces and 
civillian population or 
even to follow the 
Sub Operation Against 
Control and Command 
Systems  
To disable the leaders’ control 
and command (C2) facilities. 
(facilities used by Iraqi military 
leaders, including Saddam 
Hussein to coordinate their 
military actions)17 
 
 Attack to destroy Command Post (Post 
M)and Military and Political 
Headquarters(HQ M& P)on the national 
in Baghdad and in other places in Iraq.18 
Or places where Saddam Hussein 
controls the operation. 
 
 
Sub-Sub  Operations (SS Op I) 
AgainstIraq’s electrical power 
system 
Objective 
Disable electrical powersystems 
associated with the Iraqi military4 
especially Iraqi command and 
control facilities 
Attack to destroy  untuk electrical power 
production facilities and power grids 
associated with the military or Iraqi 
military forces,5 
Including four hydro electricl power 
plants(HPP), 6  and six thermoelectric 
power plants(TPP) 7  and several other 
power plants.  
Suboperations Against  Bombing to destroy;10 
                                                           
1Ryan Christian Else, Loc cit.  
2 M. Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport, R.I., 2000), p. 2 
3British Army, Army Doctrine Publication, p. 4-1. 
4FM3-0 Chapter 2 Unified Action, Loc cit.  
5Panos Mavropoulos, p. 97; FM3-0 Chapter 2 Unified Action;  British Army, Army Doctrine Publication, p. 94 
6 See Panos Mavropoulos, p. 97; FM3-0 Chapter 2 Unified Action;  British Army, Army Doctrine Publication, p. 97 
7Ryan Christian Elsepp 2001-2003 
8Panos Mavropoulos, p. 97 
9Ryan Christian Elsepp 2001-2003 
10FM3-0, Loc cit 
11 See the bettle between US Corp VII and Iraqi Corp XII. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibd 
17 Ibid, see also SeeAndrew Rosenthal, "No Ground Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by Hussein," The New York Times, January 17, 1991 
sebagaimana dikutip dalam Part II: The Air War advantagest Iraq  Background: Op Cit, see Paragraf on The Target In Iraq.  
18 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Chapter Six - The Air Campaign, Final Report To Congress,p. 148 Online at 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/cpgw.pdf 
see also Andrew Rosenthal, "No Ground Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by Hussein," The New York Times, January 17, 1991 as quoted in Part II: 
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Iraqi forces in 
Iraq and 
Kuwait 
 
events in the war)1 
 
Telecommuni-cationsand 
Command, Control and 
Communciations(C3) Systems 
(S Op II) 
to; 
Disable Telecommuni-cations 
and C3 Systems 8 which 
cancripple the ability to issue 
orders to the military and 
security forces, receive reports 
on the status of the operation, 
and communicate with senior 
military and political leaders. 
Cripple Iraq’s internal radio and 
television systems so;9- Reduce 
the ability to broadcast out of 
the country and can only 
broadcast sporadically within 
the country, so its use as 
propaganda is not properly 
utilized. 
- Civillian radio and television 
can no longer be used to back up 
military communication, control 
and command. 
- microwave relay  towers (MRT) 
- telephone exchanges (TE) 
-switching rooms, (SR) 
-fiber optic nodes (FON) 
- bridges that carry coaxial cables  (BCC) 
- Radio and Television Facilities (RTF) 
- Iraqi Air Force Headquarters (AFH)11 
 
Sub-Sub  OperationAgainst Iraq’s 
electrical power system (SS Op 
I) 
Objective 
Cripple the electrical power and 
electrical network associated with 
the military or the Iraqi military 
forces12especially those related to 
C3 
Disable electrical power and networks 
associated with the or Iraqi armed 
forces, 13 including4 HPPand6 TPPand 
several other power plants  
 
Operation Against 
Iraq’s Strategic 
Integrated Air Defense 
System (Op II) 
 
Objective 
Obtain and maintain 
air supremacy to allow 
unhinderedair 
operations14: 
 
Sub Operation Against 
Iraq’s Strategic Integrated Air 
Defense System (S Op III) 
 
 
Objective 
DisableIraq’s Strategic 
Integrated Air Defense 
System.15 
 Attack to destroy;16 
 
- Intermediate to upperlevel air defense 
control centers(IULADCC) 
-Radar 
- SAM (surface-to-air-missiles) 
- AAA (anti-aircraft artillery),  
- Computerized command and control 
systems built in France named Kari 
Sub-Sub OperationagainstIraq’s 
electrical power system (SS Op 
I) 
Objective 
Disable electrical power and 
networks associated with the or 
Iraqi armed forces17 especially; 
- Computerized command and 
control systems fromIraq’s 
Strategic Integrated Air Defense 
System 
- Operate reinforced doors in 
aircraft storage and maintenance 
facilities; Systems that provide 
lighting and power 
maintenance , planning , repair 
and loading bombs and 
explosive agents . 
Disable electrical power and networks 
associated with the military or Iraqi 
armed forces 18 including4 HPPand6 
TPPand several other power plants 
Sub-Sub  OperationsAgainst Iraqi 
Air Troops and Air Fields ( SS Op 
II) 
 
Objective 
Disable Iraqi air troops and air 
fields19 
 
 
Attack to destroy;20 
- air fields (AF) by creating craters and 
placing minds on the landing strips,  
- bombing air planes, maintenance and 
storage facilities (AP & MSF) and 
- attacking Iraqi military planes in the air 
especially interceptors 
- attacking C3 facilities 
Operation Against 
Iraqi NBC (Nuclear, 
Biological and 
Chemical) warring 
capablities(Op III) 
Objective; 
Main Sub-Operation / Tactical 
Sub CampaignAgainst 
Famed NBC (Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemica)l 
research, production and storage 
facilities (S Op IV) 
 Attack to destroy 
;22 
 
-Bombing the Al-Atsircomplex, 40 miles 
south of Baghdad, reported to have 
suffered minor damage 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Air War Aadvantagest Iraq  Background: Op Cit, lih. Paragraf on The Target In Iraq. 
3 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign, Loc cit 
4 Ibid,Andrew Rosenthal, "No Ground Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by Hussein," The New York Times, January 17, 1999 as quoted in Part II: 
The Air War Aadvantagest Iraq  Background: Op Cit, lih. Paragraf on The Target In Iraq.  
5Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths In The Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War, A 
Middle East Watch Report, New York, p.169 
6 Ibid, p.171 
9 Ibid 
1 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign, Loc cit 
8 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign, Lo cit 
9 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid,Andrew Rosenthal, "No Ground Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by Hussein," The New York Times, January 17, 1991 as quoted inPart II: 
The Air War Aadvantagest Iraq  Background: Op Cit, lih. Paragraf on The Target In Iraq.  
14 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign, Loc cit 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
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to 
destroy NBC warring 
capablities1 
 
 
 
 
Objective; 
To 
Disablefamed NBC facilities 2 
 
 
- Bombing the Baghdadi Nuclear 
Research and Development Center 
(NRDC) 
 
- Attacking Iraqi biochemical 
(BIOCHEM) weapons  stores or cooled 
biochemical weapon storage bunkers. 
Tactical Sub-Sub  Operations 
Against Iraqi electrical power 
systems (SS Op I) 
 
Disable electrical power and 
networks associated with the 
researching, producing and storing 
of NBC (Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical).4 
Attack to destroyelectrical power and 
networks associated with the military or 
Iraqi armed forces,5including4 HPPand6 
TPPand several other power plants 
 
Operation Against 
proyeksi kekuatan, 
infrastruk-tur dan 
produksi militer Irak 
yang penting ((Op IV) 
 
Objective; 
To elimintae Iraq’s 
military capabilities, 
Iraqi power projection, 
and infrastructure and 
important military 
production6 
 
 
Sub-Operation Against tempat-
tempat (situs-situs) produksi dan 
penyimpanan Militer(S Op V) 
 
 
Objective; 
disabling military production 
and storage facilities.7 
 
 
 Attack to destroyAttacking many targets 
that must be exterminated, for example; 8 
- military facilities (MPF) 
- reparation facilities (RF) 
- spare parts production (SPP) 
Large military complexes At-Taji  
-seven primary ammunitions storage 
facilities for example (PASF) 
Ammunition storage facilities at  Ar-
Rumaylah 
-19 secondary ammunitions storage 
facilities (SASF);  
Each consisting of a number of individual 
ammunition storage bunkers.  
Sub-Sub  Operation AgainstIraq’s 
electrical power system (SS Op 
I) 
 
Disabling electrical power 
systems and electrical networks 
especially ones related with 
military equipment production and 
storage sites. 
Attack to destroyelectrical power 
productionfacilities and electricla 
netwroks associated with military 
production and storage sites including4 
hydroelectric power plants and6 
thermoelectric power plants and several 
other electric power plants 
 
Main Sub-Operations/ Tactical 
Sub Campaigns against Scud 
missiles, launchers, and their 
production and storage facilities 
(S Op VI) 
 
 
Objective; Scud missiles, 
launchers, and their production 
and storage facilities.9 
 
 Attack to destroy;10 
-Scud Missiles (around 600) 
-Launchers (36 mobile launchers, and 28 
fixed launchers in 5 complexes in west 
Iraq and several practice launchers at At-
Taji 
-Their production and storage facilities 
(PSF) 
Sub-Operation Againstoil 
distillation and distribution (S 
Op VII) 
 
 
Disable oil distillation and 
distribution to commbat Iraq’s 
long term oil production 
capabilities.11 
 
 
 Attack to destroy 
Oil distillation facilities (ODF) which 
have direct military uses, not longterm 
raw oil production.12 
 
To destroy or damage those targets 
 
Sub-Sub  Operation AgainstIraq’s 
electrical power system (SS Op 
I) 
 
Disable electrical power systems 
and electrical networks associated 
with distilling oil 
Attack to destroyelectrical power 
production andelectrical systems 
associated with oil distillations including 
4 HPP and6 TPPand several other power 
plants 
 
Sub-Operation AgainstIraq’s 
Naval Forces and ports (S Op 
VIII) 
to 
disable naval forces and port 
facilities,13so the Coalition navy 
may move furhter into the North 
of the Persian Bay to increase 
the pressure on Iraq’s troops and 
to better support their ground 
 To do actions such as;14 
- Attacking Iaq’snaval ships (NS) 
especially those with Silkworm Rockets 
and Exocet 
 
- Capturing Kuwaiti patrol ships (KPS) 
equipped with Exocet 
Targeting port facilities and anti-ship 
missiles, 
- Attacking port facilities (PF), such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Ibid 
1 Ibid 
2 Ibid     
4 Ibid 
5  Ibid  
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign, see also Gen. Merrill A. Mc Peak, Chief of Staff of USAF, Briefing, March 15, 1991, Transcript at 6 
[hereinafter McPeak Briefing]. Sebagaimana dikutip dalam Part II: The Air War Aadvantagest Iraq  Background: Operation Desert Storm, . 
Paragraf on The Target In Iraq online pada  https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP2.htm 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
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forces  
 
 
the Khawr Az-Zubair, the main area of 
operation of the Iraqi navy, for  storage 
facilities.  
 
-Attacking anti-ship missile stores or 
maintenance facilities (AMMF) 
- Attacking the Umm Qasr Naval 
Base(NB) the Khawr Az-Zubair port 
facility, the main area of operation of the 
Iraqi navy, for  storage facilities. 
 
- Attacking seven Iraqishore based anti-
ship Silkworm missile launchers (ML) 
 
-Attacking a number of unknown 
missiles. 
 
These actions were intended to destroy or 
damage the above targets. 
Operation 
AgainstIraq’s military 
and mechanical tools 
in Kuwait ((Op V) 
 
Objective 
Make Iraq’s military 
and mechanical tools 
in Kuwait ineffectiveto 
cause its ruin1 
 
Sub-Operation 
Against functioning Bridge, 
Road and Railway connections 
(S Op IX) 
 
 
To disable functioning Bridge, 
Road and Railway connections 
Which links the military to a 
means of support to prevent or 
reduce the buildup of supply, 
and to prevent the reinforcement 
of troops deployed at the 
beginning of the air campaign2 
 
 Attack to destroybridges, roads and 
railways (BRR) 
Which connect military forces3 
Including bridges which cross the Effrat 
river4 
 
Attacking railways and bridges which 
connect Iraqi military forces with 
logistical support centers5 
 
Bombinga bridge in Nasiriyya in South 
Iraq at 3 in the afternoon6 
Bombinga bridge near the market in 
Falluja7 
Bombing3 bridges in Samawa8 
Bombingother bridges at the Shuhada 
part of Samawa at 3 in the afternoon9 
Sub-Operation 
AgainstArmy Unit including the 
Republican Guard Forces 
Commandat the Kuwait Theatre 
Operation(S Op X) 
 
To disable Army Unit including 
the Republican Guard Forces 
Commandat the Kuwait Theatre 
Operation10 
So that they will no longer be 
effective at defending Iraq’s 
annexation of Kuwait and to 
erase a significant threat for 
Saudi Arabia and other Persian 
Gulf countries 
 Attack to destroyArmy Unit (AU) 
including the Republican Guard Forces 
Command (RGFC)at the Kuwait Theatre 
Operation11 
 
Based on the above table, attacks as an act of violence occurs on two of the three levels namely the 
Operational and Tactical Level. The difference between the two levels of attack is whereas on theTactical 
Levelattacks are meant as individual acts of violence aimed at separate targets. In the context of attacks on Iraq’s 
electrical power system, these attacks are meant as acts of violence against each hydroelectric power plant, 
thermoelectric power plant, and oil-fired power plant located separate from each other. Four hydroelectric power 
plants were attacked namely 12;Saddam Dam/Mossul Dam in the Ninawa  governorate, Haditha Dam in the Al 
Anbar Governorate. Samarra Dam in the Salah ad Din Governorate and Dukan Dam in the Sulaymaniyah 
Governorate. On the other hand six thermoelectric power plants were in Bayji, situated north of Baghdad.13The 
other power plants damaged by Coalition air strikes were the power plants al-Shu'ayba and al-Najiebiya in 
Basra14 The objective of these attacks were to damage or destroy those power plants. 
On the Operational Level those attacks were meant as acts of violence against Iraq’s electrical power 
system which were aimed at disabling said electrical power system. Because this goal could only be achieved if 
those tactical attacks against those power plants succeeeded, thus attacks on an Operational Level are a group or 
a series of tactical attacks on each of the aforementioned targets. Therefore there are two definition of attacks 
with each belonging to one of two different levels of war. 
                                                           
1 Ibid 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4 Richard Pyle, Schwarzkopf/The Man, The Mission, The Triumph (Signet Books: 1991) at 129 [hereinafter Pyle]. at 211. 
5 Ibid 
6 Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraqi Hospitals Struggle With Wounds of War," The New York Times, July 5, 1991.  
7 Part III: The Means and Methods of Attack, Paragraf on The Target In Iraq, Scores of Civilians Killed in Flawed Attack on Bridge in 
Western Iraq, online pada  https://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP2.htm 
8 Middle East Watch (MEW) interview, New York, March 25, 1991. 
9 MEW interview, Azraq Evacuee Center, Azraq, Jorand, February 25, 1991. 
10 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign 
11 Chapter VI- The Air Campaign 
12 Human Right Watch, Needles Death in The Gulf War , p. 187 
13Baghdad INA, April 13, 1991, as reported in FBIS, April 16, 1991 at 15 seealso Human Right Watch, Needles Death, p. 171 
14 Ibid 
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2.3 Definition of Military Advantage and Civilian Losses Arising from Attacks Against Iraq’s Electrical Power 
System 
2.3.1 Definition of Military Advantage 
2.3.1.1. Definition of Military Advantage From The Perspective of Humanitarian Law 
In Humanitarian Law terms found relating to this case is the military advantage anticipated. This term is found in 
all the rules of international law relating to proportionality such as; Article 51 Paragraph 5 b, Article 57 
Paragraph 2 (a) (iii), Article 57 Paragraph 2 (b)  of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I of 1977), Article 3 
para 3 (c) the 1980 Protocol II to the CWC, article 3 para 8 (c)  Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996(Protocol II as amended on 3 May 
1996), Article7 cand7 d ii Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict The Hague, 26 March 1999 (now called the Protocol II Den Haaq 1999) 
and Article 8 para 2 (b) (IV) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which states; 
“….which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated.” 
Thus the term military advantage is followed by the limitations of being concrete, direct, overall,  and 
anticipated. In Humanitarian Law, there is no specific definition of military advantage. Only in several 
humanitarian laws which discuss the definition of military objects 1 are we able to discover that military 
advantages are seen from two sides namely; the ruling party or the party using that military object and the 
attacker of military objects.2 From the side of the ruling party or the user of military objects, military 
advantages are effective contributions made by those military objects to military acts done by the ruling party to 
achieve the objective of an attack or an operation. Military advantages or effective contributions by those 
military objects may arise because of the nature of said object, location, objective or use by the ruling party.3 
From the side of the attacker, military advantages are born as a result of those attacks which totally or partially 
destroy, capture, or neutralize a certain military objects thus ending its effective contribution towards the ruling 
party’s military acts thus weakening the attacked military power.4 
Thus it is not the destruction, capture, nor neutralization of said military objects that becomes the 
military advantage, but it is the effect that arises as a result which then weakens the opponent’s military force or 
the ruling party’s. This is in line with the 1868 St. Petersburgh Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, 
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grames Weight which states that the only legitimate object which States 
should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. 
What is meant by concrete, direct, overall, and anticipated is also not explained further in the 
aforementioned rules of International Humanitarian Law. Especially related to the terms concrete and direct, 
hints begin to appear in the sentence dopted by the committee III when the Additional Protocol I was being 
negotiated, namely; 
The expression "concrete and direct" was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be 
substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which 
would only appear in the long term should be disregarded.5 
Based on this sentence it can be said that the military advantage to be taken into account must be substantial 
(tangible) and apparent (perceptible), close (within a causal connection with the attack) and do not arise in the 
long term. The definition of a concrete military advantage can be seen in the words substantial (tangible) and 
apparent (perceptible). However in the records of the negotiation, the borders of what is substantial and apparent 
is not seen, whether this means that the military advantage accounted for is merely physical and thus moral, 
spiritual or mental advantages may be disregarded is not clear. The Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in its final report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY 
in 2000 states that: 
“. . . While stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine 
the government’s political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the “concrete 
and direct” military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military objective. 
                                                           
1Article 52(2) Additional Protocol I 1977, Article 2(4) of the 1980 Protocol II to the CCW, Article 2(6) of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to 
the CCW and Article 1(3) of the 1980 Protocol III to the CCW, Article 1(f) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, 
Paragraph 40 of the 1994 San Remo Manual, Article 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare 
2 See also Spain, Penal Code (1995), Article 613 (1) (b), as also quoted in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (Ed.), 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, para 342, p. 185. 
3Examples on the nature, location, purpose or use can be seen inThe US Naval Handbook (2007), International Committee of the Red Cross, 
United States of America Practice Relating to Rule 8. Definition of Military Objectives, as quoted in https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule8. 
4The logic of military advantages for the ruling party or the practical user is to disadvantage the attacker, conversely  advantages for the 
attacker will be detrimental to the ruling party or user. 
5Pilloud and Pictet, “Article 57” in Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, loc cit,as quoted in Knut Dormann, Op cit, p. 164. 
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This opinion apparently demoralizes (lowering of moral support or spirit) the population of Yugoslavia and 
weakens political support for the governor which is not something that is a concrete military advantage. Thus 
based on this committee’s opinion it can be said that moral advantages are not included in the definition of a 
concrete military advantage. However, the opinion of this committee is merely as a guide as it does not have 
binding legal force.  
Regarding the definition of a direct military advantage, the sentence the committee III adopted above 
can be seen to have the words relatively close and those which would only appear in the long term should be 
disregarded. Thus there are two elements to the direct definition namely; first, the distance of a causal link 
between a military advantage and an attack must be close, however how close the link between a military 
advantage and an attack is not clear and second, the emergence of the military advantage must be immediately 
after an attack was conducted, not in the long run, where the boundary between immediately and not or long 
term and short term is unclear. In relation to the attacks on Iraq’s electrical power plant, there is a causal link 
between the attack and the paralysis of the Iraqi leaderships’ control and command systems as well as the control, 
command and communication systems of the Iraqi armed forces.   
It can be seen that at least one stage must be passed before achieving a military advantage in the form of 
the disabling of the Iraqi leadership’s cintrol and command  system and the Iraqi armed forces’ command, 
control and communication systems, which would be the disabling of Iraq’s electrical power system. This phase 
would not exist or would be truncated had the attacks been aimed at the enemy’s command, control and 
communications system. The lack of clarity on the boundaries between millitary advantages and attacks could 
allow these military advantages to be called indirect military advantages Conversely the perpetrator would 
refer to it as a direct military advantage. 
In terms of the time of the emergence of the military advantage, the disabling of the Iraqi leadership’s 
command and control system and the Iraqi armed force’s command, control and communications system.  
Disabling control system and Iraqi Commander Iraqi armed forces’ command, control, and communications 
system were not immediate or was soon after the attack occured. This is due to the possibility of the existence of 
mobile electric generators to replace the electrical flow formerly supplied by the attacked power plants. Because 
there is no clear boundary beteween immediate or not and long term or short term and cause or effect in 
International Humanitarian Law, thus the disabling of the Iraqi leadership’s command and control systems and 
the Iraqi armed forces’ command, control and communications systems, can be called an indirect military 
advantage or conversely the perpetrator may claim it as a direct military advantage.  
Regarding the term overall, the statute did not explain what it meant. The ICRC in the Rome conference 
stated that; 
The word “overall” could give the impression that an extra unspecified element has been added to a 
formulation that was carefully negotiated during the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conference that led to 
[Additional Protocol I] and this formulation is generally recognized as reflecting customary law. The 
intention of this additional word appears to be to indicate that a particular target can have an 
important military advantage that can be felt over a lengthy period of time and affect military action in 
areas other than the vicinity of the target itself. As this meaning is included in the existing wording of 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the inclusion of the word “overall” is redundant1 
The ICRC’s explanation shows that military advantages also include effects  of the attack which cause 
the success of military actions or attack in areas aside from the target area. This suggests that military advantages 
that are included into calculations are not only those military advantages from an attack against a certain object 
but also advantages in the form ofeffects which cause the success of military actions or attacks in other areas.  
In relation with the whole of military advantages, Solf takes the example of the primary military 
advantage from the Allied attack on Germany at the Pas de Calais which was thought of by the Allied forces not 
to weaken Germany’s military power in that area, but to trick Germany into believing that the Allies’ 
amphibious attack would take place at the Pas de Clais and not Normandy Beach. Because of that, the 
anticipated military advantage of that attack was not associated with their value to the enemy.2 Solf’s explanation 
shows that military advantages also include the effects attacks have on the success of military actions  or attacks 
in areas aside from the target area which, in this case would be the effect the Pas de Clais attack had on the 
Allies success in seizing Normandy. 
Outer explains that separate actions in an operation which is described as specific attacks which are 
almost never done for its own purpose but for a larger integrated goal.3Furthermore, it is said that within the 
overall more complex campaign framework of a warring party an indibidual may calculate the relative military 
value of an individual attack’s specific goal.4Thus the definition of an overall military advantage according to 
                                                           
1 UN Doc. A/CONE.183/INF/10 of 13 Juli 1998. 
2 Solf, ‘Art.52’ in Bothe, Partsch and Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict, pp. 324 ff 
3 Oeter, ‘Methods and Means of Combat’, p. 162. 
4 Ibid, p. 119 
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these scholars is  a benefit calculated from the overall individual attack interlinked in a greater purpose namely 
the purpose of the operation or eventhe campaign.. 
The term overall military advantage is also used by several countries namely,; Netherlands1, Benin2, 
Togo3, Burundi4, Georgia5, USA6, Germany7, Mali8, Egypt9and Canada.10 Aside from that in The 2000 UNTAET 
Regulation No. 2000/15, this term can also be found. Out of all these sources there is no clear definition of the 
term overall. Only in the statement of the US Department of the Army In 1991, in reaction to an ICRC 
memorandum on the applicability of IHL, which states;  
“The concept of “incidental loss of life excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated” 
generally is measured against an overall campaign. While it is difficult to weigh the possibility of 
collateral civilian casualties on a target-by-target basis, minimization of collateral civilian casualties is a 
continuing responsibility at all levels of the targeting process”.11 
Furthermore in  the Statement of US Department of Defense In 1992,  in its final report to Congress on the 
conduct of the Gulf War it is written;  
“It prohibits military action in which the negative effects (such as collateral civilian casualties) clearly 
outweigh the military advantage. This balancing may be done on a target-by target basis, as frequently 
was the case during Operation Desert Storm, but also may be weighed in overall terms against 
campaign objectives”.12 
Based on these two statements it can be said that the definition of overall can be contrasted with the target by 
target definition. This is in line with Canada’s opinion;  
The military advantage at the time of the attack is that advantage anticipated from the military campaign 
or operation of which the attack  is part, considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of that campaign or operation.13 
Thus it is clearer that the definition of an overall military advantage is the advantage obtained from attacks on 
the targets of an operation or campaign as a whole. 
2.3.1.2. Definition of Military Advantage Based Upon the Levels of War 
To see military advantages from the perspective of the Levels of War in relation to attacks or bombings against 
Iraq’s electrical power facilities such as power plants there are two things to pay attention to namely; 1) whether 
the atttacks or bombings against those power plants caused a direct military advantage, 2) on the level of war did 
the attacks or bombings against those power plants cause a direct military advantage which is concrete, overall 
and apparent. As per the explanation above, war can be divided into three levels namelyStrategic Level, 
Operational LevelandTactical Level. Whether there are military advantages on all levels,this depends on what 
the target is, whether its destruction, capture or neutralization directly weakened the opponent’s military strength. 
Attacks against a pure active military target which strengthens the enemy’s military forces which result in its 
destruction, capture or neutralization may cause a direct military advantage on a tactical level. However, attacks 
on dual use objects such as electrical power whose role can be replaced by small and mobile electrical generators, 
the military advantage on  a tactical level is questionable. Based on the explanation in sub-chapter 2.2.1.1. on the 
definition of a military advantage from the perspective of humantiarian law, military advantage from the 
perspective of the levels of war can be seen in the following table. 
                                                           
1Netherlands, International Crimes Act (2003), Article 5(5)(b). 
2Benin, Military Manual (1995), Fascicule III, p. 14, see also Fascicule II, p. 6. 
3Togo, Military Manual (1996), Fascicule III, p. 14, see also Fascicule II, p. 6. 
4Burundi, Draft Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2001), 
Article 4(B)(d). 
5Georgia, Criminal Code (1999), Article 413(d). 
6US, Letter from the Department of the Armyto the legal adviser of the US Army forces deployed 
in the Gulf region, 11 January 1991, § 8(F), Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.5 and US, Department of Defense, Final Report to 
Congress on the Conduct of the Persian GulfWar, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, 10 April 1992, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, p. 622. 
7Germany, Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002), Article 1, § 11(1)(3). 
8Mali, Penal Code (2001), Article 31(i)(4). 
9Egypt, Declarations made upon signature of the 1998 ICC Statute, 26 December 2000, § 4(c). 
10Canada, LOAC Manual (1999), p. 4-3, §§ 20 and 21, see also p. 2-3, § 16. 
11US, Letter from the Department of the Armyto the legal adviser of the US Armyforces deployed 
in the Gulf region, Loc cit. 
12US, Department of Defense, Loc cit. 
13Canada, LOAC Manual (1999), Loc cit. 
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Table 2. Military Advantage of Coalition Forces From the Destruction of Iraq’s Electrical Power System 
Lv. War 
Specifications 
Taktical Operational  Strategic 
 
Direct/Indirect 
Direct or Indirect Military 
Advantage ? 
Direct or Indirect 
Military Advantage? 
Direct or Indirect 
Military Advantage 
Concrete/Abstract 
 
Concrete Military 
Advantage 
Concrete Military 
Advantage 
Concrete Military 
Advantage 
Target by Target/Overall Target by target Overall  Overall  
Based on the table above we are able to know; 
1. Coalition forces’ military advantage on a tactical level 
On a tactical level there is;  
a. The lack of clarity on whether the military advantage in the form of the Iraqi leadership’s control 
and command system and Iraqi armed forces’ control, command and communications system are  
direct advantages or indirect advantages of the attack on Iraq’s electrical power plant. 
This is due to the lack of clarity with regards to the boundaries on how far is the relation between 
military advantages and attacks in order to determine whether or not the advantage was direct or 
indirect. Aside ffrom that the boundary between immediate and not immediate or long term and 
short term in terms of when the military advantage occurs.Only if the direct military advantage 
was intended as a military advantage that arises once an attack occurs then there is no direct 
military advantage at the time the attack on the power plant occurred. There is only the direct 
effects which are teh destruction of the power plant and the possibility of death or injury of the 
people who were around the plant during the war. 
b. Concrete Military Advantage 
 Though there is uncertainty on whether a concrete military advantage is something that is only 
physical or whether it may include spiritual or even mental, what is clear is that military 
advantages generated by the attack on Iraq’s power plants were predicted to have produced a 
concrete military advantage as in figure three above. It is just that these gains have not been 
obtained shortly before the attack. However it is predicted that the profit will be gained after 
passing through as seen in figure 3 above. Because there are 12 power plants thus the concrete 
advantage is regarded as having been donated by each object attacked which is 1/12 for each of the 
arising military advantages, such as 1/12 for the disabling  
c. Target by targetmilitary advantage. 
Because an attack is an act aimed at each target which has been set at  the Operational Level, thus 
logically military advantages obtained are target by target advantages or military advantages from 
each attack on each target.In the case of attacks on those Iraqi power plants, arises the question 
whether the disabling of the Iraqi leadership’s command and control system as well as the Iraqi 
armed forces’ control, command and communications system were military advantages born as a 
result of target by target attacks seeing as the effects which directly occured was merely the 
shutting down of the flow of electricity. If the disabling of the Iraqi leaderships’ command and 
control system as well as the Iraqi armed forces’ control, command and communications system 
were considered military advantages obviously the question of whether said advantage were direct 
or indirect advantages from those attacks on Iraq’s power plants must be asked again. 
2. Coalition forces’ military advantage on an Operational Level 
On anOperational Level, namely on the level of sub-Operation, military advantages gained by the 
coalition forces’ attack on the power plants in iraq based on figure 3 above is estimated to have been of 
six types;  
a. Disablingthe Iraqi leadership’s control and command (C2) system 
b. Disablingthe Iraqi armed forces’ control, command and communications (C3)system  
c. Disabling Iraq’s integrated air defense system 
d. Disabling Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) research, production and storage 
facilities 
e. Disablingthe Iraqi military’s production and storage sites  
f. DisablingIraq’s oil distribution and distillation. 
On the Operational Level, the militar advantage obtained by coalition forces, as an indrect effect of the 
attack on Iraq’s power plants, based on figure 3 above is estimated to have been of four types; 
a. The disabling and the isolating of the Iraqi regime as a result of the effect on a sub operation 
level namely; disabling the Iraqi leadership’s control and command (C2) system 
anddisablingthe Iraqi armed forces’ control, command and communications (C3) system 
b. Obtaining and maintaing the air supremacy of coalition forces as a result of the effects on a sub 
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operational level namely; disabling Iraq’s integrated air defense system. 
c. The destruction of Iraq’s NBC warring capabilitiesas a result of the effects on a sub operational 
level namely; disabling Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) research, production and 
storage facilities. 
d. The loss of Iraq’s military attack abalities as a result of the effects on a sub operational namely; 
disabling the Iraqi military’s production and storage sites andIraq’s oil distribution and 
distillation. 
The coalition forces’ military advantages above do not have an explanation on whether those military 
advantages are direct military advantages or indirect military advantages because the lack of clarity in 
the boundaries regarding the directness or indirectness of a military advantage born as a result of an 
attack. In terms of whether or not it is concrete, the coalition forces’ military advantages as stated above, 
bevause it has form it can be called a concrete military advantage. 
In terms of overall specifications,the miliary advantage at the operational level is overall due to an 
accumulation of overall military advantage on the tactical level. For example, one of the military 
advantage of the attack against Iraq’s entire power plant is teh disabling of teh Iraqi leadership’s control 
and command system and the Iraqi armed forces’ command, control and communications system and 
further, the isolation and disabling of the Iraqi regime. 
3. The coalition forces’ military advantage on a Strategic Level; 
 On aStrategic Level, namely on the sub operation level, military advantage gained by coalition forces 
from attacking on Iraq’s power plant based on figure 3 above is the disabling of Iraq’s military power in 
Kuwait and Iraq’s subsequent immediate and unconditional withdrawal of their forces back to Iraq, their 
position before attacking Kuwait. The advantage on this level is the accumulation of the military 
advantage on an operational level. This advantage is already quite a distance from the cause namely the 
attacks to each  to each Iraqi power plant thus it may be said that these advantages are indirect. 
However due to the uncertainty regarding the boundaries between direct or indrect military advantages 
resulting from  an attack, normatively speaking that advantage cannot be determined as being direct and 
indirect advantages. 
 In terms whether it is concrete or not, the military advantage because it can be clearly seen. The military 
advantage at this level is also whole or overall.  
2.3.2 Definition of Civillian Loss 
 2.3.2.1. Definition of Civillian Loss from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law 
Within the rules of International Humanitarian Law, there is no mention of the term civillian loss as a 
counterpart to the term military advantage. Civilian losses have been directly specified by several items;loss of 
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, environment and cultural property. 
There was also no specification such asconcrete, direct, andoverall such as the ones found inmilitary 
advantages.Although not mentioned, specifications such asconcrete and direct, but by mentioning the items; loss 
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, environment and cultural property,civillian losses that 
are meant are only the civilian losses that are concrete and direct. Even though civillian losses may also be 
invisible (intangible) such as the grief of the bereaved family, trauma from the attack, expenditure of time, 
energy, thought for healing wounds, and loss of functions important to family and society. Aside fom that there 
is no visible loss such as costs incurred for healing. Other losses that may arise include the possibility of there 
being derivative losses. 
In the 1991 Gulf War,  the death or injury of civillians as a direct result of the attack did not amount to 
much. Most are not the direct result of an attack. As shown in the schematic above, around 170.000 Iraqi 
civillians, mostly children died due to the disabling of various systems that are essential for maintaing 
environmental sanitation and nutritional needs of the population  caused by the shutting down of electricity due 
to the bombing of Iraq’s power plants. Regarding the overall specifications,as has been done above, it is not 
found in civillian losses. This raises uncertainty regarding whether the civillian losses should be calculatedtarget 
by targetor targets attacked overall.  
2.3.2.2. Definition of Civillian Losses from the Perspective of the Levels of War  
Civillian loss from the perspective of the levels of war it can be seen in terms of direct and indirect loss, concrete 
or not and target by target or overall. On a Tactical Level, with an emphasis on target by target attacks, civillian 
losses arising are those from each target.These losses are direct losses that can be concrete and not 
concrete.Concrete losses such as death, injury, damage to civillian objects, environment and cultural objects. 
Instead direct and abstract losses are mental losses such as grief from the bereaved families, trauma of the attack, 
expenditure of time, energy and thought for wound healing and loss of functions important to family and society. 
A loss on the Operational Level are all losses arising from attacks on each target at the tactical level. Indirect 
losses such as civillian deaths due to disease and malnutrition appear at this level. Losses on a Strategic Level is 
the sum of all losses that existed on all operational levels. Civillian losses that arise are no longer only from the 
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result of the operation against Iraq’s electrical power system, but also as a result from Iraq’s strategic integrated 
air defense system and other operations.  
 
2.4 Calculating the Proportionality of Attacks against Iraq’s Electrical Power System based on the Principles of 
Justice  
2.4.1 Principles of Justice 
Aristotle, in his books Nicomachean Ethics, discussed justice from two sides. First is justice as compliance with 
the law. Here it is defined as compliance with the law. Justice means complying with the law, conversely unjust 
means not complying with the law.1 Second is justice as equality.Here justice is defined as equality or not 
accepting more than what one has a right to or thruthful. Conversely, injustice according to equality is the not 
applying of balance or accepting more than their rights or dishonest.2 
There are two kinds of justice in terms of equalitynamely; firstly,distributive justice and seccodnly, 
corrective justice. Distributive justice is justice executed in the distribution of rewards, prosperity, andother 
assets that can be shared from the community that can be allocated amongst its members evenly or unevenly.3 
For there to be justice, according to Aristotle, there should at least be four requirements (elements), namely; first; 
two people to whomjustice will be served to, second; two parts to be distributed to the two aforementioned 
people, third; that those two be equals, fourth; the two parts given are also equal. Therefore if people are not 
equal then they will not have equal parts.4 
Instead corrective justice isjustice that provides the corrective principle in private 
transactions ..….transactions that are voluntary or not.5 Another example of voluntary transaction is “sale, 
purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntarybecause 
the origin of these transactions is voluntary)”.6 
On the other hand , involuntary transactions are said to be; 
 “some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, 
false witness, and (b) others involve force, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, 
mutilation, abuse, insult.7 
As in distributive justice, corrective justice is also justice according to equality, namely; equality not based on 
geometry, but based on mathematical proportionality.8For example when someone commits a crime or benefits 
from the losses of others it creates two sections of a line (perpetrators and victims) which are not 
equivalent.According to Aristotle “the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received 
and the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the action have 
been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the 
gain of the assailant.”.9The equality portrayed by Aristotle as a midpoint between a line divided into two equal 
parts. On the other hand, inequality is portrayed as the dividing of a line into inequal parts so that one part is 
larger than the other. So that it returns to being equal, the judge needs to take a part of the larger half and give 
that part to the smaller half so that the midpoint divides that line into two equal parts. This can be seen in the 
following opinion; 
“it is as though there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he (the judge) took away that by 
which the greater segment exceeds the half, andadded it to the smaller segment. And when the 
whole has beenequally divided, then they say they have ‘their own’ — i.e. whenthey have got what 
is equal.* The equal is intermediate between thegreater and the lesser line according to arithmetical 
proportion. Itis for this reason also that it is called just (dikaion), because it is adivision into two 
equal parts (dikha), just as if one were to call itdikhaion; and the judge (dikastēs) is one who bisects 
                                                           
1This we can learn from the following opinion “both the lawless man and the grasping  and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that 
evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,Translated by W. D. Ross, at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html. Seealso Aristotle. The 
Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackman. Loeb Classical Library, London. 1926. 1129b. as quoted by Kelsen. H.  What is Justice?: 
Justice, Politic, and Law in the Mirror of Science. University of California Press.1957. as translated by Nurulita Yusron. Dasar-Dasar 
Hukum Normatif, Prinsip-Prinsip Teoritis untuk Mewujudkan Keadilan Dalam Hukum Publik. Nusa Media. Bandung. 2009. p. 146. 
2 Aristoteles, Op cit. 1129a 
3 Ibid. 1131a 
4 Ibid. For example if individuals A and B are not equal,  the rights dvidied to them are also not equal, conversely if those individuals were 
equal, the rights divided would also be equal. (See Kelsen, H Op. cit. p. 148).  
5 Ibid. This corrective justive, according to Hans Kelsen, is done by the judge in finishing conflicts and in giving out punishments to criminal 
suspects. (Hans Kelsen. Op cit. p 148.) 
6 Aristoteles, Op. cit. 1131a. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 1131b. The equity portrayed by Hans Kelsen is not just something of two ratios,but it is a balance of two things, especially two losses 
or two gains. From the side of voluntary transactions, for example are barters which require services and payment to those services which are 
worthy. From the side of involuntary, for exampleis between crime and punishment, where the punishment must be equal with the crime. 
(Hans Kelsen. Op cit. Page. 150).  
9 Aristoteles, Op. cit. 1132a. 
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(dikhastēs). Forwhen something is subtracted from one of two equals and added tothe other, the 
other is in excess by these two; since if what was takenfrom the one had not been added to the other, 
the latter would havebeen in excess by one only..10 
Further on it is explained; 
“By this, then, we shall recognize both what we mustsubtract from that which has more, and what 
we must add to thatwhich has less”.11 
When that intermediate has been achieved, this is what is just as stated in the following; 
“it is plain that just action is intermediatebetween acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; forthe 
one is to have too much and the other to have too little..12 
As stated above that the intermediate is the midpoint, this of course begs the question, how is that intermediate 
achieved or balanced? Arisstotle answers by stating the following; 
“For it is nottwo doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer,or in general people 
who are different and unequal; but these mustbe equated..”13 
As such, because what must be equal are two different things which means that there will be no mathematical 
equalit, thus these two things must go through equalization. The equalization is done with the following methods; 
1. Reciprocal exchange. 
Reciprocal exchange is portrayed by Aristotle as a return in kind as per his statement: 
“Men seek to returneither evil for evil — and if they cannot do so, think their positionmere slavery 
— or good for good — and if they cannot do so there isno exchange, but it is by exchange that they 
hold together.”14 
2. Proportioning two parts that are reciprocally interchanged  
 On this, Aristotle says; 
“But in associations for exchange this sort of justice doeshold men together — reciprocity in 
accordanece with a proportion…..”15 
This means that returning in kind, such as returning evil with evil or good with good needs to be proportional. 
Aristotle does not explain what is meant by said proportion or proportionality. Hans Kelsen tehn explains it as 
one’s portion being appropriate with the other.16Thus, what is meant by corrective justice, according to Aristotle, 
is the intermediate or midpoint between two different things that can be achieved through proportional reciprocal 
exchange.  
Based on this theory, it can be seen then in order to achieve the intermediate someone must both 
experience gain an dloss or at least gain without losing anything or if someone else loses something he should 
also gain something else of at least the same portion of his loss. 
This justice can be embodied by a state of law or in relation to international armed conflicts can also be 
embodied by the international community through an  organization or an institution of international law. In that 
organization or institution of international law legal protection in the form of laws of war are provided. That 
protection includes military interests/necessity and humanitarian interests as well as a balance between the two. 
2.4.2 Balancing the Definition of Military Advanatgae and Civillian Losses in order to Achieve Justuce 
Between Military Interests and Humanitarian Interests of Civillians  
In the attack against Iraq’s electrical power system in the Gulf War I, the effect on civillians and military can be 
seen that attacks on Iraq’s electrical power plant caused a double effect namely on civillians and on the military. 
Though they are both affected, but the effects experienced by the two are different including the specifications 
that follows. For the military, the effects they effects they recieved were only gains,, while the effects received 
by theh civillians were losses. The injustice is already clear here. This condition or state is only allowed by 
International Humanitarian Law with restrictions namely; that the civillian losses do not exceed the military 
advantage posed.  
1. Forms of Effects. 
As previously explained in the rules of International Humanitarian  Law, there is no mention of the term 
civillian losses as a counterpart to the term military advantage. Direct civillian losses are specified into 
several items namely; loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, environment and 
cultural property. By directly stating the items of said losses, the civillian losses intended here are only 
those that are concrete and other losses such as mental losses in the form of grief and trauma as well as 
other derivetave losses such as expenditure of time energy an dthought for wound healing and loss of 
                                                           
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 1132b 
12 Ibid. 1133b 
13 Ibid. 1133a 
14 Ibid. 1131a-1133a.  Returning evil with evil and good with good is known as the principle of retribution. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Kelsen, H. Op cit. p.153. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.46, 2016 
 
16 
functions important to family and society are not considered a part of civillian losses. Aside from that, by 
stating the items included in said losses the losses meant here are those that arose immediatel after the 
attacks as seen in figure 5 above. As such, the direct bad effects are civillian losses. 
Conversely for the military, military advantages are not specified into several items such as death of 
combatants and damage to the opponent’s military objects. By not directly mentioning the items that make 
up said military advantage, the scope of the definition of military advantage includes not only concrete 
military advantages but also the ones that are not. Though there are restrictions regarding the nature of 
military advantages namely concrete military advantages, but the reality is that there are certain parties that 
accept the concept of overall military advantage because of its relation with non-concrete military 
advantages which such as military advantages related to feints.17Aside from not that in terms of not 
mentioning the items of said military advantage, it also opens up the possibility to widen the interpretation 
of military advantages in relation to indirect military advantages even though international humanitarian 
law states that it is restricted only to direct military advantages. Though the boundaries between direct and 
indirect advantages are unclear.Based on figure 5 above, military advantages are not effects arising 
immediately after the attack but in the phase after the disabling of Iraq’s electrical power system. 
In order to actualize justice between military interests and the humanitarian interests of civillians there 
needs to be specifications; loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, environment and 
cultural propertyare replaced with civilian lossesso it has an counterpart in the termmilitaryadvantageor 
conversely military advantages are specified like civillian losses. Where between the two choices will be 
done depends on which one is the hardest to specify. 
2. Nature of Effect 
In civillian losses, the nature of the effects can be found in the widespread, long-term and severe 
environmental.The three natures of this effect can be found in article 8 para 2 (b) (IV) Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Courtwithout any further explanations. The term widespread are illustrated by the 
International Law Commissionas being the geographical size of the area suffering from that 
damage.18However there is no clear explanartion regarding the size of the impacted area so the damage may 
be called widespread.  
The term of Long Term is meant for environmental damage that arises immediately and is at heart long 
lasting, not damage that may happen a long time after the attack is done.19The ICRC interprets the term 
long term by referring to decades instead of months.20The term severe is illustrated by theInternational Law 
Commission as the level or intensity of said environmental damage.21However, to what level or intensity 
must that damage be to qualify as being severe, is also unclear. 
By combining the three terms;widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment,the 
German military manual refers to it as a major interferenceto the mankind’s lives and natural resources 
which is beyond the usual battlefield damage estimated in a war.22Here there is also no clear explanation 
regarding the size of ‘beyond the usual battlefield damage estimated in a war’. Thus the restriction of 
civillianlosses here includes; first by providing direct specifications in the form of loss and second, 
specifically for the environment namely by citing the three natures of environmental damage whcih causes 
said environmental damage  and then compare it with the military advantage. For military advantages, the 
nature that sticks to these effects areconcrete, direct, and overall like with military advantages. Thus the 
restrictions for military advantages only includes the nature of that military advantage and dies bit restruct 
its form through a certain specification.  
Keeping in mind the lack of clarity regarding the boundaries between concrete or non-concrete, direct and 
indirectand military advantages and there being recognition of an overall advantage thus to realize justice 
between military advantage and humanitarian interests of civillians there needs to be restrictions on nature 
which applies to civillian losses. For example if military advantages being compared are concrete, direct 
and overall military advantages within the same boundaries as the one used for military advantages.23In the 
case of the coalition forces’ attack on Iraq’s power plants for example if the concrete, direct and overall 
                                                           
17 See again Solf, Supra note.109. 
18 GAOR, 46th Session, Supplement no. 10 (A/46/10), Loc cit 
19 GAOR, 46th Session, Supplement no. 10 (A/46/10), p. 276, as also quoted inKnut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Sources and Commentary, ICRC, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 174-175. 
20 UN Doc. A/48/269, p. 9. See also A/47/328, 31 July 1992, para 20, 63, quoted in Ibid. 
21GAOR, 46th Session, Supplement no. 10 (A/46/10), p. 276, as also quoted inKnut Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Sources and Commentary, ICRC, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 174-175. 
22 Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict – Manual, DSK VV 207320067, The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, no. 403, p. 37. 
23In other literature it is said that “it must also be emphasized that the same scale has to be applied with regard to both the military advantage 
and the corresponding civilian casualties”, See Knut Dormann, Op cit, p. 173 and M. Sassoli, Bedeutung einer Kodifikation fur das 
allgemeine Volkerrecht mit besonderer Beachtung der Regeln zum Schutze der Zivilbevolkerung vor den Auswirkungen von Feindseligkeiten, 
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basle and Frankfurt am Main, 1990, p. 415. 
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military includes indirect effects such as disabling the Iraqi leadership’s C2 systems and the Iraqi armed 
forces’ C3 systemas well as four other advantages and continuing on to other derivateve advantages as seen 
in figures 3 and 5, then civillian losses also need to be calculated using the same method so that the losses 
calculated include the disabling of water purification and distribution as well three other losses which 
continue to include losses in the form of diseases and malnutrition and the death of civillians on a large 
scale as seen in figures 4 and 5. Use of the overall trait in military advantage and civillian losses which at 
the end of the day is heavily tied to the calculation of on what level are those civillian losses and military 
advantages are being calculated. 
3. Level of Effects 
Effects in the form of civillian losses can be counted on the tactical and operational level. The same thing 
applies to the effect in the form of military advantages. Effects on a tactical level mean that civillian losses 
as well as military advantages are calculated based on target by target results. While effects on an 
operational level civillian losses and military advantages are calculated based on an accumulation of the 
result of attacks on all targets. So that it is fair, the losses on a tactical level must be paired with the military 
advantage on a tactical level and civillian losses on an operational level must be paired with military 
advantages on the same level. 
2.4.3 Calculating the Proportionality of Attacks based on International Humanitarian Law and Principles of 
Justice 
In article 51 Paragraph 5 b, article 57 Paragraph 2 (a) (iii), article 57 Paragraph 2 (b)  of Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflict (Protocol I of 1977) and other rules of international law, the proportionality of attacks is stipulated 
generally namely the prohibition of any attacks which cause “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, environment and cultural property, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. There two things contained in the 
previous formulation namely; first, use of the word “excessive” in tis formulation shows there to be a 
comparison between two conflicting elements and second, the elements being compared are military advantage 
and civillian loss which has been specified namely; incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, environment and cultural property. This comparison as has been previously explained is the gain 
and lossone experiences. As such calculating the proportionality of attacks under International Humanitarian 
Law  is the comparing of these two things which conflict or are in opposition to each otherwhich then causes 
injustice where the military experience gain while the civillians experience lossthough with the restriction that 
that loss may not exceed the gain. Aside from injustice this comparison is very difficult and invites subjective 
interpretation from the attacker so that the calculation of porportionality becomes imbalanced. 
So justice is achieved between military interests and the humanitarian interests of civillians, the 
calculation of proportionality needs to calculate the probability of a third element namely advantages or gains for 
civillians as a result of that attack. In certain wars there is the possibility of gain for the civillians as seen in the 
following table; 
Table 3; Strategic purpose of war and profit for civillians 
Strategic Purpose of War Place of Attack Civil Profit 
To defend self or allies from armed 
attacks 
Done against opponent in 
agressed area or area suffering 
from an armed attack. 
Civilian population in attacked target 
area gets freedom from oppression by 
agressor forces or perpetrator of armed 
attacks. 
Humanitarian Interventionto stop 
massive violation of human rights 
against foreign nationals in country 
Done against opponent in area 
witha massive violation of 
human rights 
Civilian population in attackedtarget area 
gets freedom from from massive 
violation of human rights 
Intervention for protection of 
national abroad  
Done against opponent in area 
where foreign nationals are n 
danger 
 
Civilian population in target area gets 
freedom from harm inflicted on them by 
foreign parties in the region where they 
reside.  
To topple racist foreign colonizing, 
indvading, occupying regime. 
Done against opponent in area 
colonized, occupied or under 
a racist government regime. 
Civilian population in attacked target 
area gets freedom form foreign 
colonization, occupation and racist 
government.  . 
By calculating this civllian advantage, the rule of the proportionality of an attack only allows those 
attacks to be done if civillians do not only experience losses but also gians and those losses do not exceed the 
military advantage and the civillian advantages they experience. In its relation with the attack on Iraq’s power 
plants, the proportionality of those attacks are ideally defined as the attacks on those power plants provide 
advantages as well to the civillians of and the losses they experience do not exceed the military advantage 
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obtained by coalition forces and the civillian advantages that they obtain. A calculation of proportionality as such 
will give justice to the civillians.. 
Aside from including civillian advantages, the comparison between the conflicting elements also needs 
to be balanced. If the military and civillian advantages which will be compared do not include indirect, non-
concrete and overall advantages or military and civillian advantages on an operational level, then the civillian 
loss calculated have to be of the same nature and level. 
 
3 Conclusion 
Based on the elaboration above, it can be said that; 
a. Attacks are ideally defined as acts of violence done against an enemy done either when attacking or 
when defending but it also needs to be specified on what level is it done. On a tactical level attacks are 
defined assingle attacks or individual attackson each target such as the ones on the electrical power 
plants. On an operational level attacks are meant as a gathering or series of tactical attackson each of the 
above targetswith the operational target namely the ability produced by a series of these targets on a 
tatical level, such as for example, Iraq’s electrical power system  which is formed by the existence of a 
series of electrical power plants. Secondly this definition can be chosen as long as the elements of 
proportionality used to calculate proportionality are on the same level. 
b. In order to achieve fairness between military necessity and and the humanitarian interests of civillians, 
civillian losses which are the result of attacks are losses that do not need to be specified so that it is 
balanced with military interests/necessity which is also not specified by International Humanitarian 
These civillian losses are such losses that have the traits of being concrete, direct and overall which bear 
the same definition as  the traits concrete, direct and overall applied in military advantages or 
conversely, if the mlitary advantages do not bear the traits of being concrete, direct and overall. These 
civillian losses are also those losses counted on the same level of war as military advantages.  
c. If calculating the proportionality of attacksin International Humanitarian Law requires a comparison 
between the two conflicting elements which are incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, environment and cultural property, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,Then to achieve 
fairness between military interests and the protection of the civillian population, calculating the 
proportionality of attacks must also calculate civil profts/advantages so it is proportionate thus the 
losses suffered by the civillian calculation does not exceed the military advantage gained and the civil 
prodits earned. Aside from that, a comparison between conflicting elements must be balanced. 
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